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1. INTRODUCTION
Many important economic settings and problems have been studied with the tools of auction
theory and mechanism design more generally. Much of the literature, however, studies a static,
one-time decision. In many problems of interest, more than a single decision needs to be made;
instead, a sequence of decisions need to be made. These decisions often depend crucially on
the dynamic environment. For example, in the classical airline revenue management problem,
an airline must decide how to price seats on a ﬂight in response to its changing inventory as
well as to the evolution of the customer base. A search engine must choose how to allocate its
advertising inventory in response to changing search queries and advertiser budgets. Network
capacity (either bandwidth or computational resources) needs to be dynamically reallocated in
response to the arrival of new computational tasks of varying priority, as well as the addition
or removal of nodes from the network. Government procurement agencies must decide how to
assign new contracts in response to the changing experience, competencies, and availabilities of
contractors.
The theory of auctions and mechanism design has been extremely successful in tackling a wide
variety of problems. Unfortunately, solutions to static problems often do not translate directly
to dynamic settings. Consider, for instance, the standard second-price auction for a single object
with private values. Buyers are asked to submit bids for the good, which is then allocated to the
highest bidder. This winning bidder then pays the second-highest of the submitted bids. As ﬁrst
demonstrated by Vickrey (1961), it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for buyers to bid their true
values. Thus, the object is allocated efﬁciently: the buyer who values the object the most receives
it.
In a dynamic setting, however, the second-price auction need not retain its desirable properties.
The following example is illustrative. Suppose that there are two objects to be allocated: use of
a production facility today and use of that same facility tomorrow. Today, two perfectly patient
buyers wish to make use of the facility, the ﬁrst valuing that use at $100 and the second valuing it
at $75. A third buyer who will arrive tomorrow values use of the facility at $50. If a second-price
auction is used in each period and the buyers bid truthfully, then the ﬁrst buyer will win in the
ﬁrst period at a price of $75, and the second buyer will win in the second period at a price of $50.
On the other hand, suppose that the ﬁrst buyer instead bids $60 in the ﬁrst period and truthfully
in the second. She will then lose in the ﬁrst period, but win in the second and pay a price of $50,
below what she otherwise would have paid. Thus, bidding one’s value need not be an optimal
strategy in a sequence of second-price auctions.
Notice that in the above example, despite the lack of truthful behavior by the bidders, the out-
come is still efﬁcient. As we will discuss later, this need not always be the case. In a more general
setting when buyers are uncertain about the arrival time and willingness-to-pay of each of their
competitors, Said (2009) demonstrates that the second-price sealed-bid auction is often incapable
of yielding an efﬁcient outcome, even when bidders are forward-looking and fully rational. Thus,
in order to achieve desirable outcomes in dynamic settings, we must move beyond tools that are
best suited to static environments.
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This is precisely the aim of the recent (and growing) literature on dynamic mechanism design.
Researchers from the economics, computer science, and operations communities have been push-
ing forward our understanding of auctions, markets, and mechanisms in dynamic environments.
We survey this literature, categorizing it by the nature of the dynamics involved. In particular,
we examine two strands of literature: one in which the population of agents changes over time,
but their private information is ﬁxed; and the other in which the population of agents is ﬁxed,
but their private information changes over time. We will further divide these two categories into
thosepaperswhoseaimisachievingefﬁcientoutcomesandthosewhoseaimisachievingrevenue-
maximizing outcomes.
2. A DYNAMIC POPULATION WITH FIXED INFORMATION
We begin by exploring the possibility of implementing desirable outcomes when faced with a
dynamic population whose private information is ﬁxed. In the course of our discussion, we will
examine some of the problems that arise in such settings and how they differ from those found in
static, one-shot models.
2.1. Maximizing Social Welfare
2.1.1. Efﬁciency in the Face of Arrival and Departure Dynamics. Parkes and Singh (2003) develop
a framework for studying sequential allocation problems in a dynamic population setting. In
their world, various subsets of agents are present at various times. In particular, each agent has
an arrival time and a departure time, and has a utility function for decisions made while she is
present. What makes the problem especially difﬁcult is that the decision maker (and mechanism
designer) does not know any of this information—the designer must incentivize the agents to
reveal that information.
Despite this difﬁculty, Parkes and Singh are able to construct a mechanism (the “Online VCG”
mechanism) which generalizes the efﬁcient Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism from static envi-
ronments and implements the efﬁcient outcome. Their mechanism is a direct revelation mech-
anism in which buyers report their private information upon arrival to the mechanism. Given
these reports, the mechanism carries out an efﬁcient policy. In order to incentivize the truthful
revelation of private information, the mechanism chooses transfers that align agents’ incentives
with those of a benevolent social planner. Similar to how the static VCG mechanism sets trans-
fers equal to the externality that agents impose on other agents, the Online VCG mechanism sets
transfers equal to the expected externality that agents impose. This expected externality takes into
account not only each agents’ impact on other agents currently present, but also how that agents’
report affects any other agents that may arrive in the future.
We should note, however, that unlike the static VCG mechanism, this truthful reporting is not a
dominant strategy, as the calculation of expected externalities depends upon the truthful report-
ing of all other agents. If, instead, an agent believes that agents in the future are not reporting
truthfully, it may be in her best interest to misreport her true type.
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2.1.2. EfﬁcientSequentialAssignmentwithImpatientBuyers. Inrelatedwork, GershkovandMoldovanu
(2010) examine the allocation of a ﬁnite set of heterogeneous durable goods to a dynamic popu-
lation of randomly arriving buyers. Crucially, the buyers in this setting are impatient—they wish
to purchase an object immediately upon their arrival on the market, and only upon their arrival to
the market. Moreover, these buyers have a common ranking for the various objects.
Note that, in this setting, objects are nonperishable while buyers are impatient. This implies
that the relevant trade-off is between allocating an object to a buyer at the current time and the
option of assigning it to a buyer in the future who might value it more. In a complete information
setting, the efﬁcient dynamic allocation policy was ﬁrst characterized by Albright (1974). This pol-
icy prescribes an ordered partition of the set of possible valuations at each possible time. Agents
with values in the highest element of the partition receive the best available object, agents in the
second-highest element receive the second-best remaining object, and so on. Unsurprisingly, these
intervals may depend upon the time of an agents arrival or the set of remaining objects.
WhatGershkovandMoldovanu(2010)showisthatthisefﬁcientpolicyis, infact, implementable
in the presence of incomplete information about the valuations of arriving buyers. Since buyers
are impatient, there is no loss of generality in considering direct revelation mechanisms where
each buyer reports her type to the mechanism designer upon her arrival to the market. By charg-
ing each buyer the expected externality that she imposes on future agents, where expectations are
taken with respect to the arrival process and the valuations of future agents. This implies that
each agent’s net utility is exactly equal to her expected marginal contribution to the social welfare,
conditional on the information available at the time of her arrival—essentially, the efﬁcient pol-
icy is a dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism like the Parkes and Singh (2003) online VCG
mechanism discussed above.
2.1.3. Efﬁcient Auctions with Dynamic Populations. In closely-related recent work, Said (2008, 2009)
examines the allocation of a sequence of indivisible goods to a dynamic population of buyers.
In his setting, patient buyers demand a single unit of a perishable homogeneous good (such as
computational time on a central computing facility, or capacity in a production line). These buyers
arrive at random times to the market, and have differing private valuations independently from a
given distribution.
While a variant of the Online VCG mechanism of Parkes and Singh (2003) may be used in order
to achieve an efﬁcient allocation of objects to buyers, these mechanisms are direct revelation mech-
anisms, requiring buyers to report their values to the mechanism upon their arrival to the market.
In practice, however, direct revelation mechanisms may be difﬁcult to implement or undesirable
due to privacy or complexity concerns.
Therefore, indirect auction mechanisms are often useful. In standard static settings, the canon-
ical auction for efﬁciently allocating goods to buyers is the sealed-bid second-price auction. This
mechanism is the auction analogue of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, allocating the ob-
ject to the buyer who submits the highest bid and charging her a price equal to the second-highest
bid. Said (2009) shows that, when selling a sequence of objects, one in each period, to a stream of
buyers who arrive at random times, the sealed-bid second-price auction is no longer efﬁcient.
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In a sequential auction, buyers have an “option value” associated with losing in a particular
auction, as losing bidders have the possibility of winning in a future auction. The value of this
option to a particular buyer depends on her expectations of the prices she may have to pay in the
future. Thisis, ofcourse, dependentupontheprivateinformationandvaluesofothercompetitors.
Thus, despite the fact that buyers’ values for an object do not depend upon the information of
their competitors, the dynamics of a sequential auction market generate interdependence in (option)
values.
This interdependence implies that a standard second-price sealed-bid auction does not reveal
sufﬁcient information for the determination of buyers’ option values. In contrast, the ascending
(or English) auction is a simple open auction format that does allow for the gradual revelation
of buyers’ private information. As buyers drop out of each auction, they indirectly reveal their
private information to their competitors, who are then able to condition their current-period bids
on this information. Moreover, this process is repeated within every auction, allowing newly
arrived buyers to learn about their competitors without being privy to the detailed events of the
previous periods, thereby allowing for an efﬁcient outcome.
2.2. Maximizing Revenue
2.2.1. Revenue-Maximization in the Face of Arrival and Departure Dynamics. Returning to the setting
of arrival and departure dynamics, Pai and Vohra (2009) present what may be thought of as the
revenue-maximizing counterpart to the efﬁcient Online VCG mechanism of Parkes and Singh
(2003). Here, a seller with a ﬁxed, ﬁnite supply of a homogenous good faces a population of
potential buyers with unit demand who arrive and depart over the course of a ﬁnite time horizon.
As in Parkes and Singh, the times at which each agent arrives and departs from the market are her
private information, as is her valuation for an object. Agents types are assumed to be independent
draws from a common distribution. The seller wishes to design an incentive-compatible direct
mechanism in order to maximize her revenues.
In a static setting in which all buyers are present simultaneously, Myerson (1981) solves the
optimal mechanism design problem in the following manner:
(1) Incentive compatibility requires that the allocation rule be monotone; that is, buyers who
report a higher type must have a greater probability of receiving an object.
(2) Given a monotone allocation rule, the corresponding payment rule is pinned down (up to
a constant) via the revenue equivalence principle. When the goal is maximizing revenues,
the constant can be determined via individual rationality constraints.
(3) Combiningthesetwoobservations, therevenue-maximizationproblemcanbetransformed
to the problem of maximizing “virtual” surplus—the surplus from allocating objects less
the information rents that must be paid in order to induce truthful revelation of types.
Thus, insteadofmaximizingthesumofagents’valuesasinthecaseofefﬁcientmechanismdesign,
Myerson’s insight was that revenue-maximization is equivalent to maximizing the sum of agents’
virtual values, where the virtual value of a buyer is given by the difference between her true value
and the information rents necessary for inducing truthtelling. An optimal allocation rule therefore
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allocates objects to the buyers with the highest non-negative virtual values—precisely those with
the most favorable tradeoff between surplus and information rents.
When buyers are ex ante symmetric and the distribution of values is such that virtual values are
nondecreasing, then this optimal allocation rule is monotone in values. Thus, incentive compat-
ibility is achieved “for free” and the optimal auction corresponds to a second-price auction with
an appropriately chosen reserve. If, on the other hand, virtual values are not non-decreasing, then
the monotonicity constraint must be satisﬁed via a procedure termed “ironing” which pools some
types of agents and randomizes among them. Thus, in the static setting, increasing virtual values
is necessary and sufﬁcient for revenue-maximization to correspond to maximizing virtual surplus.
Returning to the setting of optimal auction design with arrival and departure dynamics, it is
not immediately clear how to extend Myerson’s notion of a virtual value in order to account for
both arrival and departure times. Moreover, even if such a virtual value is deﬁned, the multi-
dimensional nature of buyer types implies that we must also ﬁnd the appropriate notion of mono-
tonicity in order to guarantee incentive compatibility.
It is important to note that the use of a direct revelation mechanism is not without loss of gen-
erality in this setting with random arrival and departure times. Since buyers cannot make reports
before their arrival or claim to depart after their true departure time, the revelation principle of
Myerson (1986) need not hold (see Green and Laffont (1986) for more on restricted mechanisms
and failures of the revelation principle). However, Pai and Vohra are able to show an appropri-
ate version of the revelation principle that allocates to buyers, if at all, only in the period of their
departure. They then make use of incentive compatibility constraints to show that the optimal
allocation rule must be monotone in valuations, holding entry and exit times ﬁxed. Moreover,
incentive compatibility also requires that the allocation rule be monotone in entry and exit times.
In particular, a buyer who arrives earlier or departs later should have a greater probability of
receiving an object. (Thus, buyers are incentivized to report the greatest possible window of op-
portunity.)
Making use of the conditions imposed by incentive compatibility, Pai and Vohra (2009) are able
to arrive at a notion of virtual valuation similar to that of Myerson (1981), except that information
rents vary across reported arrival and departure times. Thus, in each period, the seller compares
the virtual surplus from allocating an object to a departing agent to the expected virtual surplus
of waiting an additional period. A departing agent will receive an object only if the former is
greater than the latter. However, unlike the setting of Myerson, increasing virtual values are no
longer sufﬁcient for such an allocation rule to be optimal, but instead additional “ironing” may be
necessary: the optimal mechanism may need to occasionally withhold an object despite a lower
future expected virtual surplus. This may be avoided, and the “greedy” algorithm that simply al-
locates to the agents with the highest virtual surplus in each period if virtual values are sufﬁciently
increasing. In particular, if (conditional on arrival time) values tend to be higher for buyers who
depart earlier than those who depart later, Myerson’s insights continue to hold and the optimal
mechanism takes the familiar “greedy” form.
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2.2.2. Optimal Sequential Assignment with Impatient Buyers. Recall the relationship between Parkes
and Singh (2003) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2010) discussed above. An analogous relation-
ship exists between the work of Pai and Vohra (2009) and Gershkov and Moldovanu (2009a). This
latter work considers the problem of revenue-maximization in a setting with a dynamic popula-
tion of impatient buyers. As in the paper discussed earlier, a seller has a ﬁnite set of heterogeneous
durable goods that he wishes to sell to randomly arriving buyers who wish to purchase an object
immediately upon their arrival to the market.
As in Pai and Vohra (2009), there is a dynamic tradeoff that is introduced by the arrival process
of buyers. In particular, when considering allocating an object to a particular agent, the seller must
consider the opportunity cost of allocating that object to future agents. However, the problem
here is (in some ways) simpler as buyers no longer have multidimensional types. Since buyers
are impatient, there is no need to consider incentives for revealing arrival or departure times—the
only dimension of private information is the private value that buyers have for each object.
Thus, the authors are able to prove that (as in the case of the efﬁcient policy), any incentive
compatible policy must take the form of an ordered partition of possible valuations at each point
in time. Agents with values in the highest element of the partition receive the best available object,
agents in the second-highest element receive the second-best remaining object, and so on.
The next step in the characterization of the revenue-maximizing dynamic mechanism is to de-
termine the revenue generated by any particular incentive compatible policy. The problem faced
by the seller upon the arrival of any particular agent can then be translated into a static problem.
More speciﬁcally, the seller must decide between allocating an object to the newly arrived agent
and obtaining the revenue generated by ignoring that agents arrival and proceeding with the
(given) policy. This is the same as the problem faced by a standard (static) revenue-maximizing
monopolist selling a single object, when the cost of that object is given by the salvage value of
the inventory (which corresponds to the expected future revenues from the dynamic policy). It is
possible, by working backwards from the case of a single-object inventory, to determine the opti-
mal partition of the valuation space for each possible inventory and point in time. The revenue-
maximizing prices that correspond to these cutoffs are then derived via revenue-equivalence.
2.2.3. OptimalAuctionswithDynamicPopulations. Inacomplementarysetting, Said(2009)explores
the properties of revenue-maximizing dynamic auctions. Instead of durable goods and impatient
buyers, he examines the assignment of a sequence of perishable goods to a population of patient
buyers. The buyers arrive to the market at random times and remain until they receive an ob-
ject. Since their values for the objects are private information, incentives must be provided for
information revelation in order to achieve an optimal allocation.
In this setting, the seller and buyers discount the future with a common discount factor d 2
(0,1). This implies that, even though objects are assumed to be individual units of a homogeneous
good, from the perspective of any individual buyer, they are differentiated products. To make this
clear, consider a buyer i with value vi who is present on the market at some time t. If this buyer
receives an object in period t, she receives a payoff of vi. However, if she anticipates receiving an
object in period t + 1, then her expected payoff is dvi. Thus, she does not value the two objects
identically.
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This alters the appropriate condition for incentive compatibility. Recall that in static settings
with single-unit demand, incentive compatibility requires that increasing a buyer’s type should
increase her probability of receiving an object. In this dynamic setting with single-unit demand,
incentive compatibility instead requires that increasing a buyer’s type should, roughly speaking,
increase her probability of receiving an object sooner. (Formally, the expected discounted proba-
bility of receiving an object should be nondecreasing in type.) This characterization of incentive
compatibility allows for the derivation of a revenue-equivalence theorem for this setting, which
implies that revenue maximization can be achieved (in the Myersonian tradition) by maximizing
the virtual social surplus.
In particular, Said (2009) shows that applying a variant of the online VCG mechanism discussed
above to virtual values maximizes revenues. Instead of providing each buyer with a net utility
equal to her expected marginal contribution to the social surplus, Said’s mechanism leaves each
buyer with a net utility equal to her expected marginal contribution to the virtual surplus where
values have been replaced by the standard formulation of virtual values. Moreover, if an indi-
rect mechanism is desired, the discussion above related to efﬁcient indirect mechanisms remains
relevant—instead of a sequence of second-price sealed-bid auctions with an optimally chosen re-
serve price, a seller should use a sequence of ascending auctions with that same reserve price.
If objects are durable instead of perishable, the recent work of Board and Skrzypacz (2010)
provides a characterization of the optimal dynamic auction. As before, the revenue-maximizing
direct mechanism applies an efﬁcient mechanism to virtual values. This implies that there is a
constant cutoff value below which objects are not allocated, and the object is allocated to the buyer
with the highest valuation exceeding that cutoff. This cutoff is determined by a simple one-period-
look-ahead policy which requires the seller be indifferent between selling to the cutoff type in the
current period and waiting an additional period for new buyers to arrive.
With a single durable object to be allocated, these cutoffs are constant in all but the ﬁnal period,
and then drop in that period to the static monopoly price. This implies that buyers either buy
immediately upon their arrival or wait for the “ﬁre sale” in the ﬁnal period. If the seller wishes to
use an indirect mechanism in order to implement this optimal policy, Board and Skrzypacz show
that a sequence of second-price auctions with deterministically declining reserve prices is optimal.
These reserve prices are chosen such that the cutoff type is exactly indifferent between purchasing
in the current period or waiting an additional period. The reserve price must be declining so as to
compensate this cutoff-type buyer for the losses due to discounting, but must also compensate for
the possibility of new competition arriving in future periods; therefore, the reserve price must fall
at a rate faster than the discount rate.
3. A FIXED POPULATION WITH DYNAMIC INFORMATION
The preceding section examined dynamic auctions and mechanisms for settings in which there
is a dynamic population with static, ﬁxed types. A large and important class of problems, how-
ever, does not ﬁt within this framework. Consider, for instance, the case of sponsored search,
where search engines sell advertising slots alongside “organic” search results. In this setting, ad-
vertisers who are interested in a particular keyword may revise their estimates of the value of an
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advertisement based on their experiences over time. The natural question that arises in such a
setting is how to design mechanisms and auctions in order to properly account for the dynamic
nature of the environment and respond to changing private information.
We ﬁrst consider the case of implementing socially efﬁcient outcomes in environments with
dynamic information. The mechanisms we examine generalize mechanisms from classical static
mechanism design to incentivize the truthful revelation of changing private information in a dy-
namic setting. We then turn to the objective of maximizing revenues and discuss the recent work
in that area.
3.1. Maximizing Social Welfare
3.1.1. Dynamic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) consider the problem of
providing incentives for truthtelling and satisfying participation constraints in an efﬁcient mech-
anism. They consider a general inﬁnite-horizon dynamic model in which participants observe a
sequence of private signals over time, and a sequence of decisions must be taken in response to
these signals. The distribution of signals may depend on previously observed signals or decisions;
however, these signals are independent across agents (conditional on observables).
Bergemann and Välimäki propose the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism (also called the Dynamic
VCG mechanism). This mechanism is the natural generalization of the static Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism to a dynamic environment. Recall that the VCG mechanism incentivizes
truthtellingbymakingefﬁcientdecisionsandchoosingtransfersequaltotheexternalitiesimposed
on the rest of the system so that each agent’s net utility is equal to their marginal contribution to
the social welfare. However, doing so in a dynamic setting does not yield incentive compatibility.
The key insight of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) is that in a setting with dynamic private
information, incentives for truthtelling and efﬁciency may be guaranteed by choosing payments
in each period to be equal to the ﬂow externalities. More precisely, the externality that an agent’s
report in any given period imposes on all other participating agents may be decomposed into a
current period effect and a future (expected) effect. By committing to a sequence of transfers equal
to the sequence of current-period externalities, the mechanism designer or social planner is able
to give each buyer a ﬂow payoff equal to her ﬂow marginal contribution to the social welfare.
Therefore, each agent’s expected discounted payoff, looking forward from any period, is equal to
her total marginal contribution to the social welfare (again, starting at that point). This property
(which ﬁgured in Bergemann and Välimäki (2003, 2006) in the construction of efﬁcient dynamic
auctions in a complete information setting) implies that, in each period, all participating agents
internalize the impact of their current reports on others, thereby aligning their incentives with
those of the efﬁciency-minded planner.
Cavallo, Parkes, and Singh (2006) develop a mechanism similar to the Dynamic Pivot Mecha-
nism in a setting with agents’ whose type evolution follows a Markov process. In Cavallo, Parkes,
and Singh (2009), they extend dynamic VCG to settings in which buyers are “periodically inac-
cessible” and are unable to make reports (as in the case, for instance, of a network setting where
connectivity is sometimes lost). Moreover, Cavallo (2008) has shown that the dynamic pivot mech-
anism is also similar to its static VCG counterpart in that it achieves greater revenue than any other
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possible dynamic mechanism which is also efﬁcient. Therefore, in settings where the mechanism
designer is concerned with both revenue and efﬁciency, the use of the dynamic pivot mechanism
may provide a partial resolution to the conﬂict among the two.
3.1.2. Efﬁciency and Budget-Balance. Athey and Segal (2007) consider a similar setting to that of
Bergemann and Välimäki (2010); however, they are also interested in ﬁnding an efﬁcient mecha-
nism that is budget-balanced—that is, a mechanism that requires no external subsidies or “money
burning” by the participants.
In order to do so, Athey and Segal propose the “Team Mechanism.” This mechanism executes
the efﬁcient decision rule and induces truthfulness by all agents. It does so by providing a transfer
to each agent that is equal to the sum of utilities of all other agents in each period. Such a trans-
fer scheme ensures that each agent is a residual claimant for total social surplus, and hence her
incentives are aligned with those of a benevolent social planner, just as in a static Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanism. In particular, this means that each agent maximizes her utility in each period
by truthfully reporting her new private information and behaving in accordance with the efﬁcient
decision rule.
However, this Team Mechanism is not budget balanced—the Team Mechanism requires an ex-
ternal source of funds to subsidize the operation of the mechanism. To this end, Athey and Segal
modify the Team Mechanism in a generalization of the classical AGV mechanism of d’Aspremont
and Gérard-Varet (1979). The AGV mechanism, in a static environment, incentivizes truthtelling
by charging agents transfers equal to the “expected externality” their reports impose on others.
However, the value of these transfers are dependent upon agents’ beliefs, and in a dynamic set-
ting, these beliefs may be evolving over time and may, in fact, be manipulated by other agents. In
order to avoid such manipulations, Athey and Segal construct the “Balanced Mechanism” which
takes advantage of the dynamic setting, using the changes in the expected present value of other
agents’ utilities. By doing so, agents continue to internalize the expected externality that they im-
pose upon others. Moreover, these new transfers are not manipulable by other agents, thereby
allowing for budget balance while also implementing efﬁcient outcomes.
One should note that, as with the static AGV mechanism, it may be impossible to both balance
the budget and also satisfy participation constraints. Although the Balanced Mechanism satisﬁes
ex ante participation constraints (so that all agents wish to participate in the mechanism at the time
of contracting), it differs from the Dynamic Pivot Mechanism of Bergemann and Välimäki (2010)
in that some agents may wish to exit the mechanism after some histories. Athey and Segal (2007)
show, however, that if the time horizon is inﬁnite and agents are sufﬁciently patient, then it is
possible to satisfy these “periodic” participation constraints.
3.2. Maximizing Revenue
3.2.1. Contracting with Dynamic Information. In many environments, buyers learn about their de-
mand over time. In an important contribution, Courty and Li (2000) consider optimal dynamic
contracts for such a setting. In their model, buyers have private information about the future dis-
tribution of their valuations for the seller’s object. Subsequently, these buyers then privately learn
the realization of their value. While a monopolist could choose to wait until buyers learn their
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realized values and then charge them the standard monopoly price; however, by requiring buyers
to reveal their private information sequentially, the seller is able to extract additional surplus. In-
stead of “screening” buyers once after all private information is acquired, revenue-maximization
requires screening them twice with a set of contingent contracts.
As in a standard static mechanism design problem, revenue-maximization corresponds to allo-
catingtothebuyerswiththehighestvirtualvalues, therebymaximizingvirtualsurplus. However,
since buyers’ initial types inﬂuence their ultimate value for the good, the concept of a virtual value
in this context must take into account this inﬂuence. Speciﬁcally, the information rents “paid” to
buyers in the ﬁrst period (at the time of contracting) must account for the informativeness of ini-
tial types about future types: the more informative the initial type about the future realization, the
greater the information rents that must be paid. Since incentive compatibility requires monotonic-
ity in the allocation rule, this implies that distortions away from efﬁciency are correspondingly
increased.
Es˝ o and Szentes (2007) consider a closely related setting in which buyers have an initial esti-
mate of their valuation, and the seller is able to control buyers’ acquisition of additional reﬁned
information. Speciﬁcally, the seller is able to choose whether to allow buyers to receive additional
signals that are correlated with their private information. They show that in the optimal revenue-
maximizing mechanism, the seller releases all the additional private information that she is able
to. Moreover, her revenue in this case is as large as the revenue she would be able to achieve if she
could observe this information—quite surprisingly, buyers gain no advantage from this additional
information and receive no additional information rents when the seller is able to control the ﬂow
of information. Roughly speaking, by using a more sophisticated dynamic mechanism, the seller
pays information rents to buyers in the initial period in order to incentivize the revelation of their
initial private information, but subsequently extracts all remaining potential surplus.
In a particular application, Es˝ o and Szentes (2007) show how such a mechanism would operate.
Suppose buyers’ initial private information is a noisy signal of their value, and that they can then
receive additional information that informs them of their actual value. The optimal mechanism
in this case is a “handicap auction” in which buyers can purchase an advantage in a second-stage
efﬁcient auction. More concretely, each buyer purchases a price premium from the seller (where
a smaller premium costs more), and then in the second period (after the revelation of additional
information) the buyers engage in a modiﬁed second-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner
is required to pay his purchased premium in addition to the second-highest bid. The seller is able
to extract additional revenue by inducing buyers with higher expected values to purchase smaller
handicaps for the second-stage auction.
Battaglini (2005) examines a differing setting with an inﬁnite horizon and characterizes the
revenue-maximizing long-term contract of a monopolist facing a buyer whose value follows a
Markov process. This optimal contract is nonstationary; however, this contract (eventually) con-
verges over time to the efﬁcient supply. A crucial insight is that any information rents that are
paid to any type of the buyer at some time t create rents for all other types of the buyer in previ-
ous periods—since there is a positive probability the buyer’s type will evolve to the type receiv-
ing information rents in the future, all types of the buyer can expect higher continuation utilities.
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While some of this additional utility can be extracted by the seller in period t 1, rent-extraction is
limited by the need to guarantee incentive compatibility in that period. Moreover, this argument
“cascades” to all previous periods as well. This implies that, along any history of the buyer-seller
relationship, distortions must be diminishing over time, and hence we approach the efﬁcient con-
tract.
3.2.2. Dynamic Incentives and Revenue Equivalence. The recent contribution of Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka (2009a) generalizes the results of Myerson (1981) and Baron and Besanko (1984) to a gen-
eral dynamic setting. In particular, they characterize incentive compatibility and revenue in multi-
period settings with dynamic private information. The primary challenge in such settings is an
element of multi-dimensionality. Instead of the single dimension of potential misreports possible
in a traditional static mechanism design problem, agents may be able to misrepresent multiple
“pieces” of information, possibly choosing misreports contingent on her previous private infor-
mation.
The key step in their analysis is the development of a “dynamic payoff formula” which ex-
pressesthederivativeofanagent’sexpectedpayoff(andhencetheseller’srevenue)inanincentive-
compatible mechanism with respect to her private information. This formula summarizes the lo-
cal incentive compatibility constraints that a mechanism designer must respect. Pavan, Segal, and
Toikka demonstrate the manner in which this dynamic payoff formula relies on incentive compat-
ibility not only in a given period, but also in all future periods; therefore, they are able to capture
not just the impact of a change in an agent’s private information on her current-period payoffs,
but also the inﬂuence on future private information.
This machinery yields a dynamic revenue equivalence theorem: the expected revenue in any
dynamic mechanism is determined entirely (up to a constant) by the allocation rule alone. More-
over, the authors show that expected revenue in an incentive compatible mechanism is given ex-
actly by the expected virtual surplus generated by that mechanism, where agents’ virtual values
(as in Baron and Besanko (1984); Courty and Li (2000); and Es˝ o and Szentes (2007)) depend upon
the informativeness of current-period private information on future private information. Thus,
Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009a) provide necessary conditions (and some sufﬁcient conditions)
for incentive compatibility and a general methodology for revenue-maximization in dynamic set-
tings.
One limitation of the generality of that work, however, is the difﬁculty in establishing general
sufﬁcient conditions for the incentive compatibility of a mechanism that are easily veriﬁed. In a
complementary paper, Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2009b) use an approach pioneered by Es˝ o and
Szentes (2007) to represent an agent’s future-period types as a function of their ﬁrst-period type
and a random “shock” that is independent of the ﬁrst-period type. This approach allows the
identiﬁcation (under slightly different assumptions) of conditions for incentive compatibility in
inﬁnite-horizon settings.
Despite this, however, sufﬁcient conditions for incentive compatibility often need to be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis for various models. One such determination may be found in
Kakade, Lobel, and Nazerzadeh (2010), which sets out a model of sponsored search auctions in
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which advertisers learn about the efﬁcacy of their advertisements over time. Their model com-
bines elements of both private information and statistical learning. In particular, private infor-
mation evolves according to a multi-armed bandit process (Deb (2008) also considers a similar
setting). The authors also impose “separability” conditions on the stochastic process governing
the evolution of private information (speciﬁcally, that it is a Markov process) along with additive
or multiplicative separability of buyers’ utility functions in their initial private information and
future private information. These conditions are, in fact, sufﬁcient conditions under which the
maximization of virtual surplus by using an efﬁcient algorithm (the Gittins index policy) applied
to virtual values maximizes revenue.
4. FURTHER READING
A large body of work has developed in this area. For further reading and examples of dynamic
auctions and mechanisms for settings with changing private information, the curious reader may
wish to consult, among others, Akan, Ata, and Dana (2009); Aviv and Pazgal (2008); Cavallo
(2009); Doepke and Townsend (2006); Gallien (2006); Satterthwaite and Shneyerov (2007); Ger-
shkov and Moldovanu (2009b); Parkes (2007); Shen and Su (2007); Talluri and van Ryzin (2005,
Chapter 6); and Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Maglaras (2002).
12DYNAMIC AUCTIONS
REFERENCES
AKAN, M., B. ATA, AND J. DANA (2009): “Revenue Management by Sequential Screening,” Un-
published manuscript, Carnegie Mellon University.
ALBRIGHT, S. C. (1974): “Optimal Sequential Assignments with Random Arrival Times,” Manage-
ment Science, 21(1), 60–67.
ATHEY, S., AND I. SEGAL (2007): “An Efﬁcient Dynamic Mechanism,” Unpublished manuscript,
Harvard University.
AVIV, Y., AND A. PAZGAL (2008): “Optimal Pricing of Seasonal Products in the Presence of
Forward-Looking Consumers,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10(3), 339–359.
BARON, D. P., AND D. BESANKO (1984): “Regulation and Information in a Continuing Relation-
ship,” Information Economics and Policy, 1(3), 267–302.
BATTAGLINI, M. (2005): “Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 95(3), 637–658.
BERGEMANN, D., AND J. VÄLIMÄKI (2003): “Dynamic Common Agency,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 111(1), 23–48.
(2006): “Dynamic Price Competition,” Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1), 232–263.
(2010): “The Dynamic Pivot Mechanism,” Econometrica, 78(2), 771–789.
BOARD, S., AND A. SKRZYPACZ (2010): “Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Durable Goods: Posted
Prices and Fire-sales,” Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.
CAVALLO, R. (2008): “Efﬁciency and Redistribution in Dynamic Mechanism Design,” in Proceed-
ings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ’08), Chicago.
(2009): “Mechanism Design for Dynamic Settings,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 8(2).
CAVALLO, R., D. C. PARKES, AND S. SINGH (2006): “Optimal Coordinated Planning Among Self-
Interested Agents With Private State,” in Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual Conference on
Uncertainty in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (UAI’06), pp. 55—62, Cambridge.
(2009): “Efﬁcient Mechanisms with Dynamic Populations and Dynamic Types,” Unpub-
lished manuscript, Harvard University.
COURTY, P., AND H. LI (2000): “Sequential Screening,” Review of Economic Studies, 67(4), 697–717.
D’ASPREMONT, C., AND L.-A. GÉRARD-VARET (1979): “Incentives and Incomplete Information,”
Journal of Public Economics, 11(1), 25–45.
DEB, R. (2008): “Optimal Contracting Of New Experience Goods,” Unpublished manuscript, Yale
University.
DOEPKE, M., AND R. M. TOWNSEND (2006): “Dynamic Mechanism Design with Hidden Income
and Hidden Actions,” Journal of Economic Theory, 126(1), 235–285.
ES ˝ O, P., AND B. SZENTES (2007): “Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap
Auction,” Review of Economic Studies, 74(3), 705–731.
GALLIEN, J. (2006): “Dynamic Mechanism Design for Online Commerce,” Operations Research,
54(2), 291–310.
GERSHKOV, A., AND B. MOLDOVANU (2009a): “Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Hetero-
geneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach,” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
1(2), 168–198.
13BERGEMANN AND SAID
(2009b): “Learning About the Future and Dynamic Efﬁciency,” American Economic Review,
99(4), 1576–1587.
(2010): “Efﬁcient Sequential Assignment with Incomplete Information,” Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 68(1), 144–154.
GREEN, J. R., AND J.-J. LAFFONT (1986): “Partially Veriﬁable Information and Mechanism De-
sign,” Review of Economic Studies, 53(3), 447–456.
KAKADE, S. M., I. LOBEL, AND H. NAZERZADEH (2010): “An Optimal Dynamic Mechanism for
Multi-Armed Bandit Processes,” Unpublished manuscript, Microsoft Research New England.
MYERSON, R. B. (1981): “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 58–73.
(1986): “Multistage Games with Communication,” Econometrica, 54(2), 323–358.
PAI, M., AND R. VOHRA (2009): “Optimal Dynamic Auctions,” Unpublished manuscript, North-
western University.
PARKES, D. C. (2007): “Online Mechanisms,” in Algorithmic Game Theory, ed. by N. Nisan,
T. Roughgarden, É. Tardos, and V. V. Vazirani, chap. 16, pp. 411–439. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge, UK.
PARKES, D. C., AND S. SINGH (2003): “An MDP-Based Approach to Online Mechanism Design,”
in Proceedings of the 17th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS ’03).
PAVAN, A., I. SEGAL, AND J. TOIKKA (2009a): “Dynamic Mechanism Design: Revenue Equiva-
lence, Proﬁt Maximization and Information Disclosure,” Unpublished manuscript, Northwest-
ern University.
(2009b): “Inﬁnite-Horizon Mechanism Design: The Independent-Shock Approach,” Un-
published manuscript, Northwestern University.
SAID, M. (2008): “Information Revelation and Random Entry in Sequential Ascending Auctions,”
in Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC ’08), Chicago.
(2009): “Auctions with Dynamic Populations: Efﬁciency and Revenue Maximization,” in
Proceedings of the First Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications (AMMA
2009), Boston.
SATTERTHWAITE, M., AND A. SHNEYEROV (2007): “DynamicMatching, Two-SidedIncompleteIn-
formation, and Participation Costs: Existence and Convergence to Perfect Competition,” Econo-
metrica, 75(1), 155–200.
SHEN, Z.-J. M., AND X. SU (2007): “Customer Behavior Modeling in Revenue Management and
Auctions: A Review and New Research Opportunities,” Production and Operations Management,
16(6), 713–728.
TALLURI, K. T., AND G. VAN RYZIN (2005): The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management.
Springer, New York.
VICKREY, W. (1961): “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of
Finance, 16(1), 8–37.
VULCANO, G., G. VAN RYZIN, AND C. MAGLARAS (2002): “Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Rev-
enue Management,” Management Science, 48(11), 1388–1407.
14